

1 SAML & XML-Signature Syntax and Processing

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17 Abstract

18 XML Signature is used in SAML for assertion integrity, assertion
19 authentication and signer authentication as defined in [SIG]. The XML
20 Signature specification [SIG] defines how this can be achieved and
21 provides many options. This document details the use of XML Signature
22 for SAML assertions and protocols.

23 Referenced Documents

24 [SIG] XML-Signature Syntax and Processing, W3C Proposed Recommendation.

25 <http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/PR-xmldsig-core-20010820/>26 [RFC3126] RFC 3126 : Electronic Signature Formats for long term
27 electronic signatures

28 [RFC3125] RFC 3125 : Electronic Signature Policies

29

30 **Notational Conventions**

31 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
32 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
33 document are to be interpreted as described in Key Words for Use in
34 RFC's to Indicate Requirement Levels (RFC 2119).

35 **Status of this Document**

36 This document represents work in progress upon which no reliance should
37 be made.

38 **Document Version History**

39 o Version 0.001:

40 o Version 0.002:

41

42 **Related Files**

43 The web site <http://www.oasis-open/committees/security/xxxxx> contains
44 the current version of all the related files.

45

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1 Role of Digital Signatures in SAML

SAML Assertions, Request and Response messages may be signed, with the following benefits:

- An Assertion signed by the issuer (AP). This supports :
 - (1) Message integrity
 - (2) Authentication of the issuer to a relying party
 - (3) If the signature is based on the issuer's public-private key pair, then it also provides for non-repudiation of origin.
- A SAML request or a SAML response message signed by the message originator. This supports :
 - (1) Message integrity
 - (2) Authentication of message origin to a destination
 - (3) If the signature is based on the originator's public-private key pair, then it also provides for non-repudiation of origin.

Note :

- SAML documents may be the subject of signatures from in many different packaging contexts. [SIG] provides a framework for signing in XML and is the framework of choice. However, signing may also take place in the context of S/MIME or Java objects that contain SAML documents. One goal is to ensure compatibility with this type of "foreign" digital signing.
- It is useful to characterize situations when a digital signature is NOT required in SAML.

(1) Assertions: asserting party has provided the assertion to the relying party and authenticated by means other than digital signature. In other words, the RP has obtained the assertion from the AP directly (no intermediaries) and the AP has authenticated to the RP.

(2) Request/Response messages: the originator has authenticated to the destination and the destination has obtained the assertion directly from the originator (no intermediaries).

Many different techniques are available for "direct" authentication between two parties. The list includes SSL, HMAC, password-based login etc. [QUESTION: Do we need to constrain this list further?]

- All other contexts require the use of digital signature for assertions and request and response messages. Specifically:
 - (1) An assertion obtained by a relying party from an entity other than the asserting party MUST be signed by the issuer.

116 (2) SAML message obtained arriving at a destination from an entity
117 other than the originating site MUST be signed by the origin
118 site.
119
120
121
122
123
124

125 2 Signing Assertions

126 All SAML assertions MAY be signed using the XML Signature. This is reflected
127 in the schema :

```
128 <element name = "Assertion" type = "saml:AssertionAbstractType"/>
129   <complexType name = "AssertionAbstractType" abstract = "true">
130     <sequence>
131       <element ref = "saml:Conditions" minOccurs = "0"/>
132       <element ref = "saml:Advice" minOccurs = "0"/>
133       <element ref = "ds:Signature" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
134     </sequence>
135     <attribute name = "MajorVersion" use = "required" type = "integer"/>
136     <attribute name = "MinorVersion" use = "required" type = "integer"/>
137     <attribute name = "AssertionID" use = "required" type = "saml:IDType"/>
138     <attribute name = "Issuer" use = "required" type = "string"/>
139     <attribute name = "IssueInstant" use = "required" type = "timeInstant"/>
140   </complexType>
141
```

142 3 Request/Response Signing

143 All SAML requests and responses MAY be signed using the XML Signature. This is
144 reflected in the schema :

```
145
146   <complexType name="RequestAbstractType" abstract="true">
147     <attribute name="RequestID" type="saml:IDType" use="required"/>
148     <attribute name="MajorVersion" type="integer" use="required"/>
149     <attribute name="MinorVersion" type="integer" use="required"/>
150     <element ref = "ds:Signature" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
151   </complexType>
152
153   <complexType name="ResponseAbstractType" abstract="true">
154     <attribute name="ResponseID" type="saml:IDType" use="required"/>
155     <attribute name="InResponseTo" type="saml:IDType" use="required"/>
156     <attribute name="MajorVersion" type="integer" use="required"/>
```

```
157         <attribute name="MinorVersion" type="integer" use="required"/>
158         <element ref = "ds:Signature" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
159     </complexType>
160
```

161 4 Signature Inheritance (a.k.a. super-signatures 162 & sub-messages)

163 4.1 Context

164
165 SAML assertions may be embedded within request or response messages or
166 other XML messages, which may be signed. Request or response messages may
167 themselves be contained within other messages that are based on other XML
168 messaging frameworks (e.g., SOAP) and the composite object may be the subject
169 of a signature. Another possibility is that SAML assertions or
170 request/response messages are embedded within a non-XML messaging object
171 (e.g., MIME package) and signed.

172
173 In such a case, the SAML sub-message (Assertion, request, response) may be
174 viewed as inheriting a signature from the "super-signature" over the enclosing
175 object, provided certain constraints are met.

- 176
- 177 (1) An assertion may be viewed as inheriting a signature from a super
178 signature, if the super signature applies all of the mandatory elements
179 within the assertion.
 - 180
 - 181 (2) A SAML request or response may be viewed as inheriting a signature from
182 a super signature, if the super signature applies to all of the
183 mandatory elements within the response.

184

185 4.2 Proposal

186 Signatures MAY be inherited in the SAML domain. i.e. if a SAML request/response
187 has a signature, then if any of the assertions in the res/resp packages are
188 not signed, they inherit the super-signature.

189 But if assertions need to be passed around by themselves, or embedded in other
190 message they would need to be signed as per section 2.1

191

192 5 XML Signature Profile

193
194 The [SIG] specification calls out a general XML syntax for signing data
195 with many flexibilities and choices. This section details the constraints on
196 these facilities so that SAML processors do not have to deal with the full
197 generality of [SIG] processing.

198

199 **5.1 Signing formats**

200

201 XML Signature has three ways of representing signature in a document viz:
202 enveloping, enveloped and detached.

203 SAML assertions and protocols would use the enveloped signatures for signing
204 assertions.

205

206 **5.2 CanonicalizationMethod**

207

208 [Sig] REQUIRES the Canonical XML (omits comments)
209 (<http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315>). SAML RECOMMENDS the
210 Canonical XML with Comments ([http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-
211 20010315#WithComments](http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315#WithComments))

212 **5.3 Transforms**

213

214 [Sig] REQUIRES the enveloped signature transform
215 <http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmlsig#enveloped-signature>

216

217 **5.4 KeyInfo**

218 Any valid key which is acceptable by the [SIG] is acceptable to SAML as
219 well. SAML does not restrict or impose any additions in this area. Which means
220 it is possible NOT to have the KeyInfo element and then arrive at the keyinfo
221 by context.

222 **5.5 Object**

223 The Object element SHOULD NOT be present in the signature block

224 **5.6 Binding between statements in a multi-statement assertion**

225 **5.6.1 MultipleAssertionType**

226 This structure packs multiple related statements as one assertion. The
227 relationships between these assertions are implied.

228 **5.6.2 Multiple Assertions in a ResponseType**

229 This structure packs multiple assertions in a response message. The
230 relationship between the assertions in this case is arbitrary i.e. no
231 inter-assertion relationship should be assumed just because all the
232 assertions were packaged in the sane response message

233

234 **5.7 Security considerations**

235 **5.7.1 Replay Attack**

236 The mechanisms stated here-in does not offer any counter measures against a
237 replay attack. Other mechanisms like sequence numbers, time stamps,
238 expiration et al need to be explored to prevent a replay attack.

239

240

241

241 **6 Issues, To Do**

242

Issue	Status
√ Binding between different SAML fragments	N/A
√ Replay Attack ?	Added security considerations Para
√ Granularity	
Multiple signers	Next Version
Signing multiple assertions	Use MultipleAssertionType for related statements or have multiple assertions in response for unrelated assertions
Detached signature as attribute assertions to tie payload ?	?
Or a new assertion payload assertion ?	?
√ Trust assertion due to bearer or the stated issuer? [Kelvin Beeck]	Stated issuer
√ Encryption?	Next Version
√ Counter Signature	Next Version
√ Multiple Signature	Next Version
√ Manifest	Next Version
√ Bearer Assertion	Next Version

243

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